Beatrice Sasha Kobow
Agency: Its Limits, Frames, and Sources
| 道德經: | Dao De Jing: |
| 不尚賢，使民不爭；不貴難得之貨，使民不為盜；不見可欲，使心不亂。是以聖人之治，虛其心，實其腹，弱其志，強其骨。常使民無知無欲。使夫1知者不敢為也。為無為，則無不治。 | (Keeping the people at rest) Not to value and employ men of superior ability is the way to keep the people from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles which are difficult to procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; not to show them what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their minds from disorder. Therefore the sage, in the exercise of his government, empties their minds, fills their bellies, weakens their wills, and strengthens their bones. He constantly (tries to) keep them without knowledge and without desire, and where there are those who have knowledge, to keep them from presuming to act (on it). When there is this abstinence from action, good order is universal. |
The quote above is from the ancient Chinese text Dao De Jing and it poses the question whether inaction is required for a universally good order. This is going to be our question. When we ask the philosopher what she can contribute to a common project of sustainable development in terms of competence, the answer must have to do with understanding the limits, frames and sources of our agency. It should include an account of how philosophers might have been mistaken about conceptions of agency, and it should explain related concepts such as ‘obligation’, ‘rights’, ‘rationality’, ‘reason’, and ‘meaning’.
I would like to engage in a critical discussion with you about the social ontology of agency: that is – the social character of norms which are negotiated, maintained and enjoyed in a community of rule followers.
===== Reading material ===== * IPCC AR Chapter 3
talk on 12 Jan 2023 — Ringvorlesung in the Winter Term 2022/23